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One of the primary goals of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) has been 
the reduction and elimination of health disparities, generally defined as population-level health 
differences that adversely affect disadvantaged groups, including disparities associated with sex 
and gender. Many of PPACA’s general provisions — expanded access to public and private 
insurance coverage, guarantee issue and pricing reforms, and coverage mandates — were 
expected to reduce barriers and eliminate discriminatory practices targeting or disproportionately 
impacting women and transgender individuals. Provisions like the Women’s Health Amendment, 
which mandated women’s preventive healthcare to be covered without cost sharing, and the even 
broader prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, disability, age, 
and sex in Section 1557 of PPACA also promote gender equity. 
Prior to PPACA, a patchwork of federal laws targeted only certain areas for sex 
nondiscrimination protections and enforcement, notably employment (Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964) and education (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). Such laws 
had been used to address healthcare access to some degree, but their scope has been limited. For 
example, Title VII has been used to eliminate coverage exclusions that uniquely harm women, 
such as pregnancy-related care, but only in employment-based plans. 
Section 1557 filled this critical gap by creating a new healthcare-specific prohibition of sex 
discrimination. Prohibiting sex and gender discrimination was a dominant focus of the May 2016 
Final Rule implementing Section 1557 (2016 Final Rule) issued by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Notably, the 2016 Final Rule 
clarified that Section 1557’s sex discrimination provision would protect transgender individuals 
from discrimination on the basis of gender identity in healthcare delivery and insurance. 
By contrast, in June 2020, OCR issued new regulations that dramatically narrowed Section 
1557’s scope, including interpreting the prohibition on sex discrimination to not include 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity or transgender status (2020 Final Rule). In 
addition, the 2020 Final Rule significantly expanded the grounds for providers of care or 
insurance to obtain exemptions from nondiscrimination mandates. 
The battle over the scope of sex discrimination protection is also playing out in the courts. 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently weighed in on this issue, though not in the 
healthcare context. In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, a consolidation of three high-profile 
cases involving claims of sex discrimination in employment under Title VII, the Supreme Court 
affirmed a definition of sex discrimination consistent with the 2016 Final Rule. In a 6-3 decision, 
the Court held that an employer that fires an individual merely for being transgender or gay 
violates the sex discrimination prohibition under Title VII. Bostock’s implications for Section 
1557 are significant, but the fact that it is a non-healthcare case means the battle over the scope 
of sex discrimination protections under Section 1557 will continue. 
This article examines the current regulatory and litigation landscape for defining and enforcing 
PPACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination in healthcare. It considers three key questions 
engaging regulators and courts at this time, which are discussed below: Who is protected? What 
kind of activity is prohibited or required? How should religious objections to these requirements 
be balanced against the health and equity interests advanced by nondiscrimination protections? 
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